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A duty of employee loyalty seems i-suited to modern-day la-
bor relations, where employees often drive employers toward eco-
nomic ruin in order to gain bargaining concessions. Indeed, in en-
acting the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 1 Congress
expressly protected many disloyal employee actions, including
work stoppages2 and picketing.' The NLRA, however, fails to ad-
dress directly whether employees who publicly disparage their em-
ployers' business activities deserve protection from reprisals.
Drawing on the Supreme Court's opinion in NLRB v Local Union
No. 1229 ("Jefferson Standard")," the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB" or "Board") and federal circuit courts have at-
tempted to fill this gap by permitting an employer to fire employ-
ees who commit acts of "indefensible" disloyalty during a labor
dispute. However, no satisfactory standard has emerged for deter-
mining the point at which disparagement becomes "indefensible."
The lack of a satisfactory standard threatens the rights of em-
ployees engaged in labor disputes. Disloyalty is a pliable and sub-
jective concept that could chill much employee activity currently
protected by the NLRA.5 Moreover, the disloyalty doctrine has ap-
t A.B. 1989, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1993, The University of Chicago.
1 29 USC §§ 151-69 (1988).
2 29 USC § 163 (1988). Section 163 states: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as spe-
cifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede...
in any way the right to strike ......
3 29 USC § 158(b)(7) (1988). Section 8(b)(7) prohibits picketing for certain objectives.
Implicitly recognized, though, is the right to picket for other objectives. See generally Julius
G. Getman and John D. Blackburn, Labor Relations: Law, Practice and Policy 513-14
(Foundation Press, 2d ed 1983) (discussing the historical use of picketing as an organiza-
tional tool and the creation of § 8(b)(7) as a compromise between interests of labor and
management).
4 346 US 464 (1953).
1 See 346 US at 479-80 (Frankfurter dissenting) ("Many of the legally recognized tac-
tics and weapons of labor would readily be condemned for 'disloyalty' were they employed
between man and man in friendly personal relations."). See also Case Comment, Loyalty as
Proper Grounds for Discharge, 1954 U Ill Law F 137, 140 ("Disloyalty is a loose concept and
conceivably could be invoked in almost any situation where employees have a dispute with
their employer.").
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pealed to courts deciding other employment actions, such as those
under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act' and the common
law of employment contracts.7 In all of these employment settings,
"disloyalty" often marks the line between unemployment and rein-
statement with back pay.
This Comment examines the judicial application of the disloy-
alty doctrine and then proposes a new standard for determining
what kinds of public disparagement the NLRA protects. Section I
explores the statutory framework applicable to public disparage-
ment issues, as well as the legislative history behind that frame-
work. Section II traces the judicial evolution of the disloyalty doc-
trine. Finally, Section JII proposes importing the distinction
between mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining to define
the border between protected activity and unprotected disloyalty.
I. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The Wagner Act" and the Taft-Hartley Act,9 comprising most
of the present NLRA, provides the statutory framework behind
the disloyalty doctrine.1" Against a historic backdrop of meager
and constitutionally uncertain employment rights,1' the Wagner
Act and its forerunners accorded employees the right, among
6 See, for example, Hochstadt v Worcester Foundation, 545 F2d 222, 233-34 (1st Cir
1976) (employee's disloyalty in complaints over salary and ratings and interference with
laboratory research" provided nondiscriminatory basis for discharge under Title VII of Civil
Rights Act).
See Heller v Champion Int'l Corp., 891 F2d 432, 436 (2d Cir 1989) (employee's secret
taping of discussions with employer in anticipation of action for breach of implied employ-
ment contract is not disloyal).
S Pub L No 74-198, 49 Stat 449 (1935), codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 151-69
(1988).
9 Pub L No 80-101, 61 Stat 136 (1947), codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 151-69
(1988).
10 The Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub L No 86-257, 73 Stat 519 (1959), codified at 29 USC
§§ 151-69 (1988), also provides a large portion of the present NLRA. However, the Lan-
drum-Griffin Act largely concerned subjecting internal union affairs to federal regulation. It
also tightened the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA, restricted organizational and
recognitional picketing, and conferred upon states jurisdiction over cases declined by the
NLRB. See'Getman and Blackburn, Labor Relations at 36 (cited in note 3).
11 On the legal landscape prior to protective legislation, Lewis L. Lorwin and Arthur
Wubnig wrote:
Employers were ... legally free to impose upon their employees any forms of labor
organization which it suited their convenience to impose. Employers also had the right
to hire and fire for any and all reasons. Most significant with reference to labor organi-
zations was the right of employers to hire and fire on the basis of the wage earner's
labor union affiliations.
Lewis L. Lorwin and Arthur Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards 448 (Brookings, 1935). The
Supreme Court has also stated:
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others, to organize and bargain collectively. In reaction to resulting
disparities, the Taft-Hartley Act provided employers with rights
that its conservative sponsors hoped would restore a balance of
bargaining strength in industrial relations. Between these two sets
of rights lies the disloyalty doctrine.
A. Statutory Framework
The NLRA protects employees from reprisals for most activi-
ties arising out of labor disputes. Section 7 states, in part, that
"[e]mployees shall have the right.., to engage in ... concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection .... ,,12 Section 8(a)(1), the enforcement provision
behind this right, forbids an employer "to interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
[§ 7]."11 If an employer violates § 8(a)(1), the NLRB will find the
employer guilty of an unfair labor practice and will order remedial
action as directed by § 10(c).14
These provisions create a broad prohibition on employer inter-
ference with union activity, but the activity must meet two condi-
tions to receive protection: it must be "concerted" and it must be
within the judicially created class of "protected" activities. 15
Courts have construed the "concerted" requirement broadly. Any
action by two or more employees acting together is automatically
[Labor unions] were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee
was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent ordinarily on his daily
wage for the maintenance of himself and family. If the employer refused to pay him the
wages that he thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and to
resist arbitrary and unfair treatment.
American Steel Foundries v Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 US 184, 209 (1921).
Rights granted by the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat 195 (1933) ("NRA"), were
constitutionally uncertain. See Lorwin and Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards at 446-47 (dis-
cussing constitutional concerns).
's 29 USC § 157 (1988). Section 7 states in full:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi-
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in
section [8(a)(3)].
13 29 USC § 158(a)(1) (1988).
14 29 USC § 160(c) (1988).
5 Protected is a term of art not drawn from § 7. The courts invented this requirement
so as to avoid holding all concerted activity lawful. See, for example, NLRB v City Disposal
Systems, 465 US 822, 837 (1984) ("The fact that an activity is concerted [ ] does not neces-
sarily mean that an employee can engage in the activity with impunity.").
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"concerted." ' Even a single employee's action may satisfy this re-
quirement. For example, if a single employee asserts a right
grounded in a collective bargaining agreement, this action is
"concerted."'1 7
The second requirement, that the activity fall within a pro-
tected class of activities, is also construed broadly. It generally en-
compasses activity for the "mutual aid or protection" of fellow em-
ployees, which the Board and the courts have construed to include
most forms of concerted employee activity.18 However, the Board
and the courts have withheld protection from two kinds of activi-
ties: 'those that have an objective that is unlawful or in violation of
an NLRA policy,19 and those that employ means involving major
violence or misconduct.20
Section 10(c) also limits the scope of protected activity. That
section, in part, removes the protection of the NLRA from an em-
ployee who is discharged "for cause."2  Activities that would lead
to a dismissal "for cause" are thus defined as being beyond the
territory protected by § 7. But while § 7 and § 10(c) purport to
define the limits of NLRA protection, they do not yield a firm bor-
der between protected and unprotected activity.
B. Legislative History
Sections 7 and 10(c) of the NLRA reflect different eras and
legislative objectives. Section 7 manifests the pro-union objective
of the New Deal supporters of the Wagner Act,2 2 which consoli-
18 See id at 831.
z' See id at 831-32. See also, Note, Individual Rights for Organized and Unorganized
Employees Under the National Labor Relations Act, 58 Tex L Rev 991 (1980) (exploring
policies behind protection of employee acting alone).
18 See, for example, Eastex, Inc. v NLRB, 437 US 556, 570 (1978) (distribution on em-
ployer's property of union newsletter seeking pro-union political agitation protected).
19 See Southern Steamship Co. v NLRB, 316 US 31, 39-48 (1942) (strike that consti-
tuted mutiny under criminal code unprotected); Thompson Products, Inc., 72 NLRB 886,
887-89 (1947) (strike to compel employer to violate NLRB certification of a different union
unprotected).
'0 See Elk Lumber, 91 NLRB 333, 338-39 (1950) (slowdown unprotected); Audubon
Health Care Center, 268 NLRB 135, 136 (1983) (partial work stoppages unprotected); Co-
lumbia Portland Cement Co. v NLRB, 915 F2d 253, 258-59 (6th Cir 1990) (employee who
attacked non-striking employee with baseball bat lawfully discharged).
21 29 USC § 160(c) (1988). Section 10(c) states in relevant part: "No order of the Board
shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or
discharged.., for cause."
22 See Benjamin S. Kirsh, The National Industrial Recovery Act: An Analysis 16 (Cen-
tral Book, 1933) (detailing how the predecessor to the Wagner Act was companion legisla-
tion to other New Deal measures, such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act).
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dated previous statutory efforts to improve the lot of employees.23
In contrast, § 10(c) reflects the purposes of a Republican Congress
twelve years later, amending § 10(c) as part of its response, in the
Taft-Hartley Act, to the rising strength of trade unions.24
Supporters of the Wagner Act wanted to promote employees'
rights to organize and to bargain collectively, but they otherwise
sought no change in existing labor law.25 They were not concerned
with conduct at the margins, so they did not define § 7 rights with
enough clarity to determine whether it protected public disparage-
ment.28 As with the NRA, 7 so anxious was Congress to combat the
effects of the Depression that debate over fundamental elements of
the bill supplanted debate over the outer limits of § 7 protection.
A conception of bilateral obligations on employers and unions
underlay the Wagner Act. Prior to the labor acts of the early
1930s,2s Wagner Act supporters maintained employers enjoyed nat-
ural advantages of organization over employees as well as some ju-
dicial favoritism. 2 9 The Wagner Act was designed to create equal
bargaining strength by granting employees rights that employers
already enjoyed.30 For instance, under § 7, employees could select
'$ Congress passed the Wagner Act in the wake of the failure of the National Industrial
Recovery Act. Like the later Wagner Act, the NRA protected unionization and collective
bargaining. See Getman and Blackburn, Labor Relations at 29 (cited in note 3).
24 See Gerard D. Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 Geo Wash
L Rev 285, 285 (1960) ("With the continued growth in the economic and political power of
organized labor .... the primary objective of Congress... was to restore sufficient equilib-
rium to ... industrial relations to enable our traditional system of private enterprise to
continue.").
" Senator Walsh, a key supporter of the Wagner Act, stated:
[The bill] makes absolutely no change whatever in existing law, so far as the relation of
employers and employees are concerned, except in those limited respects that relate to
collective bargaining and the right of employees to organize without interference by
employers.
79 Cong Rec 7658, reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act,
1935 2369 (NLRB, 1949).
26 For a fuller discussion of the debate over § 7, see Lorwin and Wubnig, Labor Rela-
tions Boards at 29-44 (cited in note 11). For a history of § 7, see Robert A. Gorman and
Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 130 U Pa L Rev 286, 331-46 (1981).
17 For a fuller discussion of the debate over § 7(a) of the NRA, the antecedent to § 7 of
the Wagner Act, see William H. Spencer, Collective Bargaining Under Section 7(a) of the
NIRA 4-6 (Chicago, 1935).
2$ See for instance, the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act of 1932, 47 Stat 70
(1932), codified at 29 USC §§ 101-15 (1988).
' See Duplex Printing Press Co. v Deering, 254 US 443, 484-85 (1921) (Brandeis dis-
senting) (discussing judicial bias favoring employers over employees).
" See S Rep No 573 on S 1958, 74th Cong, 1st Sess 3 (1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative
History of the NLRA at 2302 (cited in note 25) ("[E]quality of bargaining power [ ] is a
prerequisite to equality of opportunity and freedom of contract. The relative weakness of
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their own bargaining representatives free of employer interference;
employers could hardly deny that they already enjoyed that
right.31
Supporters of the Taft-Hartley Act shared this conception of
imposing bilateral obligations. However, they correctly believed
that the Wagner Act had placed obligations on employers that did
not bind employees.3 2 The Taft-Hartley Act was intended to even
the balance of bargaining strength by imposing symmetrical
obligations."3
Like Wagner Act partisans, supporters of the Taft-Hartley Act
endorsed the fundamental need to protect collective bargaining.3
Therefore, the authors of Taft-Hartley did not amend § 7, the
main wellspring of employee rights. However, to curb perceived
union abuses of § 7 rights, the authors amended § 10(c) to limit
the scope of protected activity under § 7 by endowing employers
with greater protection. 5
The amended § 10(c) emphasized that not all "concerted" em-
ployee activity should be protected. Supporters of the Taft-Hartley
Act disapproved of Board decisions that had expanded the realm
of protected activity to include traditionally lawful causes for dis-
missal or discipline. They specifically argued that the Board had
extended protection to employee delinquency, spoiling of goods,
and interference with manufacturing. 6 Supporters of the amend-
ment also argued that the Board had overreached its statutory
mandate under the Wagner Act by protecting concerted activity
the isolated wage earner caught in the complex of modem industrialism has become [] a
commonplace [and is worsening].").
31 See text accompanying notes 110-11.
32 For example, the Wagner Act prevented an employer from refusing to bargain collec-
tively with employees but did not impose a similar obligation on employees. 29 USC
§ 158(a)(5) (1988).
33 For example, employees could not refuse to bargain collectively with employers. 29
USC § 158(b)(3) (1988).
34 See Getman and Blackburn, Labor Relations at 34 (cited in note 3).
11 Many conservative legislators would have preferred to repeal the Wagner Act in full.
However, a frontal assault on the Act or on its main provision, § 7, was considered politi-
cally impossible. Therefore, these legislators were content to amend § 10(c) to correct the
perceived imbalance in the employee-employer relationship. For a discussion of the discon-
tent with the Wagner Act which led to the amendments (through the Taft-Hartley Act), see
id at 31-35 (cited in note 3).
6 Matter of Wyman-Gordon Company, 62 NLRB 561 (1945). See also HR Rep No 245,
80th Cong, 1st Sess 42 (1947), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the Labor Management
Relations Act 333 (NLRB, 1948) ("The change.., is intended to put an end to the belief,
now widely held and certainly justified by the Board's decisions, that engaging in union
activities carries with it a license to loaf, wander about the plants, refuse to work, waste
time, break rules, and engage in incivilities and other disorders and misconduct.").
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otherwise unlawful or in breach of a lawful employment contract.
The amendments to § 10(c) were intended to reaffirm the Su-
preme Court's reversals of such cases where the Board had ex-
tended protection. 7
None of the activities that the amendment addressed included
public disparagement of the employer's business activities.3 8 In
fact, neither the NLRA nor its legislative history makes reference
to public disparagement or "disloyalty." Pressing concerns such as
recovering from the Depression and, in the case of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act, concern with quelling post-World War II strikes left little
time for debate on the outer limits of § 7 protection. The existing
scraps of legislative history suggest a congressional intent, at a
minimum, to exempt from protection employee activity whose ob-
ject violates a statute or NLRA policy or whose means violate a
statute or shop rules, as well as an intent to impose equal obliga-
tions on employers and unions.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE DISLOYALTY DocTRINE
The disloyalty doctrine originated in the courts.3 9 Though
some federal courts came close to articulating the disloyalty doc-
trine in decisions after the Wagner Act, it did not blossom until
Jefferson Standard.° Since Jefferson Standard, the NLRB and
federal circuit courts have both extended and contracted the reach
of the doctrine, depending on the "disloyalty" test adopted.
17 See 93 Cong Rec 6600 (Jun 5, 1947) (extension of remarks by Senator Taft), re-
printed in 2 Legislative History of the Labor Management Relations Act 1538 (NLRB,
1948). The cases included: Fansteel Metallurgical Corp. v NLRB, 306 US 240, 252 (1939)
("sit-down" strike involving destruction of employer's property not protected); Southern
Steamship, 316 US at 39-48 (strike that constituted mutiny under criminal code unpro-
tected); and NLRB v Sands Mfg. Co., 306 US 332 (1939) (strike with objective in violation
of collective bargaining agreement not protected). See also HR Rep No 510, 80th Cong, 1st
Sess 55 (1947) (Conference Report), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the LMRA at 559
(cited in note 36) (Communist activities or activities contrary to shop rules also singled out
as unprotected).
" See Local Union No. 1229 v NLRB, 202 F2d 186, 187-88 nn 4-10 (DC Cir 1952)
(summarizing opinions prior to the Taft-Hartley Act).
39 See Cynthia L. Eastlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public In-
terests, and Freedom of Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U Pa L
Rev 921, 989 (1992) (prior to Wagner Act, employment relationship governed by "master
and servant" law that included general duty of loyalty forbidding employee from damaging
employer's business).
40 346 US at 474-75.
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A. Jefferson Standard
Jefferson Standard is the touchstone of the disloyalty doc-
trine. In that opinion, the Court applied the "for cause" language
of § 10(c) to restrict the zone of protected activity under § 7.41
The Court held that concerted activity showing indefensible dis-
loyalty by employees in a labor dispute did not merit the protec-
tion of the NLRA.42
In Jefferson Standard, a technicians' union had a collective
bargaining dispute with a television station, but did not go on
strike. During their off hours, some of the technicians distributed
handbills severely criticizing the quality of the station's program-
ming, suggesting that their employer treated the city as "second
class. '43 The handbills made no reference to the union, collective
bargaining, or the ongoing labor dispute."
The Court of Appeals held that the handbilling was protected,
overturning the Board which had held that the handbills were
"hardly less 'indefensible' than acts of physical sabotage. ' 45 The
Court of Appeals ruled that the Board must find that the handbills
were unlawful before it could hold them unprotected. 4 The court
stated that the line between protected activity and unprotected
acts of disloyalty should be drawn at illegality.47
41 Id at 472-75.
42 Id at 477-78. In addressing sections 7 and 10(c), the Court implied that the analyses
of both provisions are the same. Id.
41 The handbill, in full, stated:
Is Charlotte A Second-Class City?
You might think so from the kind of Television programs being presented by the
Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Co. over WBTV. Have you seen one of their television
programs lately? Did you know that all the programs presented over WBTV are on
film and may be from one day to five years old. There are no local programs presented
by WBTV. You cannot receive the local baseball games, football games or other local
events because WBTV does not have the proper equipment to make these pickups.
Cities like New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington receive such programs nightly.
Why doesn't the Jefferson Standard Broadcasting Company purchase the needed
equipment to bring you the same type of programs enjoyed by other leading American
cities? Could it be that they consider Charlotte a second-class community and only




" Local Union No. 1229, 202 F2d at 188.
" Id at 187-88 (section 7 does not protect activities contravening provisions or policies
of the NLRA or federal or local statutes compatible with the NLRA). Judge Bazelon's inter-
pretation of § 7 is consistent with both the legislative history and the Supreme Court's
holding in Jefferson Standard. See text accompanying notes 22-42.
47 Local Union No. 1229, 202 F2d at 188.
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On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that illegality is not the
litmus test for protection. The Court held that while employees
continue to work they owe a duty not to disparage the product or
services of their employer or to hamper her sales, even if such ac-
tivities would not violate any laws.48 It also recognized that this
duty persisted during a strike, since strikers intend to return to
work and have reinstatement rights. The Court stated that
"[t]here is no more elemental cause for discharge of an employee
than disloyalty to his employer.
49
Furthermore, the Court was troubled by the technicians' lack
of candor. The technicians, in attacking management policies, had
not disclosed their true motive: hoped-for concessions at the bar-
gaining table. Though the Court did not decide the case on this
basis, it stated that, had the technicians disclosed their motive,
their attack would have cost more public support than it would
have gained.50
B. Disloyalty Tests
Since Jefferson Standard, the NLRB and federal circuit
courts have extended the scope of the disloyalty doctrine. Labor
dispute activities varying dramatically from those in Jefferson
Standard have challenged the boundaries of the disloyalty doc-
trine in such areas as breach of confidentiality, 51 diversion of busi-
ness, 5 2 and insubordination.53 This Comment, however, focuses on
public disparagement as a form of disloyalty.
4' The Court in Jefferson Standard found the roots of the disloyalty doctrine not only
in the Taft-Hartley Act but also in case law before and after that Act. See 346 US at 474-76.
See also NLRB v Jones & Laughlin, 301 US 1, 46 (1937) ("[T]he Board is not entitled to
make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that right is
exercised for other reasons than [ ] intimidation and coercion"); Hoover Co. v NLRB, 191
F2d 380, 389 (6th Cir 1951) ("[An employee] can not collect wages for his employment, and,
at the same time, engage in activities to injure or destroy his employer's business").
"I Jefferson Standard, 346 US at 472. For a critical perspective on the disloyalty doc-
trine, see Eastlund, 140 U Pa L Rev at 941-56 (cited in note 39) (the doctrine fails to ac-
count for legitimate employee concerns about product quality).
60 346 US at 476-77. At best, nondisclosure of the labor dispute is an alternative ground
for decision. Prior to the discussion of nondisclosure, the Court had already stated that the
Taft-Hartley Act did not protect attacks on management policies.
5' NLRB v Knuth Brothers, 537 F2d 950, 956 (7th Cir 1976) (disclosing confidential
information to customers disloyal); IBM Corp., 265 NLRB 638, 644 (1982) (disclosure of
wage data that was legitimately classified as confidential disloyal).
11 Kenai Air Service, 235 NLRB 931, 934-36 (1978) (employee who planned to use
strike to divert business to rival engaged in unprotected disloyalty); Crystal Linen & Uni-
form Service, Inc., 274 NLRB 946, 950 (1985) (strikers who worked for employer's competi-
tor and solicited employer's customers to transfer business to competitor engaged in unpro-
tected disloyalty).
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The Board and most circuit courts have developed two tests
for determining whether public disparagement amounts to unpro-
tected disloyalty. They have examined either the purpose behind
the disparagement or the relation of the disparagement to the la-
bor dispute or both.5 4
Unfortunately, these disloyalty tests have produced uneven re-
sults. Loose from the moorings of Jefferson Standard, the Board
and the circuits have left a patchwork of decisions that provide
insufficient predictability in the application of § 7.
1. "Related to" the labor dispute.
Among circuits that have considered the disloyalty doctrine in
the public disparagement context, the dominant approach has
been to protect only disparagement that is "related to" the labor
dispute.5 5 To satisfy the "related to" standard, these circuits gen-
erally have looked for a connection between the disparagement and
the employees' "working conditions." However, circuits have dis-
puted, at least in result if not openly, what constitutes "working
conditions" and how close the connection must be.
This dispute has yielded inconsistent results over whether dis-
paragement about, for example, management policies unrelated to
the treatment of employees should be protected if the disparage-
ment bears an indirect relation to "working conditions." The Sec-
ond Circuit in Misericordia Hospital Medical Center v NLRB56
held protected nurses' public criticisms of their hospital's patient
53 Reef Industries, Inc., 300 NLRB 134, slip op at 16, (1990) (disparaging T-shirt sent
to personnel manager during labor dispute constituted protected activity).
"The First Circuit may employ another disloyalty test that balances the harm done to
the employer against the employee's interest in furthering union policies. In NLRB v Circle
Bindery, 536 F2d 447 (1st Cir 1976), a union worker hired at a non-union bindery reported
to his union that the shop was taking on jobs from a union printer obligated not to give
work to non-union binderies. As a result, the bindery lost the business. The court found that
the Board had appropriately examined the extent of harm to the employer by the disparage-
ment against the employee's interest in furthering union policies. See id at 452-53.
15 See, for example, Misericordia Hospital Medical Center v NLRB, 623 F2d 808, 814
(2d Cir 1980).
Id. "Misericordia is only one of a number of decisions that appear to exaggerate, or
even manufacture, the element of self-interest that brings section 7 into play." Eastlund,
140 U Pa L Rev at 936 (cited in note 39). See also Golden Day Schools, Inc. v NLRB, 644
F2d 834, 840-42 (9th Cir 1981) (day care center workers' complaints to parents about the
quality of child care at the center protected); Allied Aviation Service, 248 NLRB 229, 232
(1980), enforcement granted, 636 F2d 1210 (3d Cir 1980) (mechanic's letter to customers
about lax safety practices protected); NLRB v Mount Desert Island Hospital, 695 F2d 634,
640-41 (1st Cir 1982) (nurses' complaints in letter published in newspaper about the quality
of medical care protected).
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care facilities because of a relation to "working conditions." The
hospital in Misericordia had penalized nurses for contributing to a
report that focused on problems such as inadequate staffing and
emergency room policies and was concerned almost exclusively
with the way these problems affected patient care.5 7 Yet the
Eighth Circuit in NLRB v Red Top, Inc."s refused protection to
similar threats by an employee. The employee of the janitorial ser-
vice in Red Top threatened to complain to a main customer, a hos-
pital, about the poor job the janitorial service was performing in
order to "interfer[e] with the employer's commercial interests" and
thereby gain bargaining concessions. 9 Both cases involved man-
agement policies unrelated to the conditions of employment and,
therefore, should have reached similar results.
In accord with the Second Circuit, the Board liberally con-
strues what constitutes a relation to "working conditions." For well
over a decade, the Board has not denied protection to any em-
ployee disparagement of management policies due to an insuffi-
cient relation to "working conditions."60 For instance, in Cordura
Publications, the Board protected employees who sent letters to,
among others, the parent corporation alleging shoddy practices in
automobile collision research.61 The employees predicted harm to
the public, not to themselves, through the allegedly decreased
safety standards."2 As explored in the next section, however, the
Board has repeatedly denied § 7 protection based on a purpose
test.
2. The purpose test.
The Board and most circuits that have considered disparage-
ment under the disloyalty doctrine have also examined the purpose
57 623 F2d at 810-12.
455 F2d 721, 727 (8th Cir 1972). The Third Circuit tacitly agreed. See NLRB v Pin-
cus Brothers, Inc., 620 F2d 367, 375-77 (3d Cir 1980) (employee's distribution of a defama-
tory leaflet critical of her employer and union with regard to wages was "arguably unpro-
tected" disloyalty).
51 455 F2d at 727.
60 The "related to" test is satisfied according to the Board as long as a labor dispute
exists and the disparagement is a tactic that may resolve that labor dispute. Allied Aviation
Service, 248 NLRB 229, 230 (1980) (employees protected where they sent letters to airline
customers concerning "sensitive" and "delicate" safety issues concerning airline mainte-
nance procedures).
61 280 NLRB 230 (1986). See also Allied Aviation, 248 NLRB 229.
62 280 NLRB at 230-31.
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of the disparagement to determine disloyalty.63 Disparagement
that satisfies the "related to" standard may still be denied protec-
tion if it serves an improper purpose. To find purpose, the Board
and these courts have evaluated the rhetorical tone of the dispar-
agement including such factors as sarcasm,6 4 vulgarity,65 immatur-
ity,6 6 and impulsiveness.6 7
Naturally, such a subjective inquiry has yielded uneven re-
sults. The Ninth and Second Circuits have held protected harshly
worded disparagement that may well have seriously damaged the
employer's business.6 8 Meanwhile, the Fourth and Eighth Circuits
have refused protection to disparagement milder or comparable in
tone. 9 The Board has rendered similarly asymmetrical holdings.70
Without clear, objective standards for judging purpose, such une-
ven results are unavoidable.71
83 For a representative Board opinion, see American Arbitration Ass'n, 233 NLRB 71,
75 (1977) (sarcastic letter written with vengeful purpose to employer's clients concerning
dress code disloyal). See also New River, 945 F2d at 1295 (sarcastic letter critical of em-
ployer's gift of free ice cream cones "prepared as a lark" disloyal); Golden Day, 644 F2d at
841 (child care workers' leaflet containing harsh language and serious charges about the care
of the children protected where designed to protest unlawful discharges); Misericordia, 623
F2d at 814 ("responsible" employee report critical of hospital's operations written to remedy
deficiencies in working conditions protected); and Red Top, 455 F2d at 727 (threats to com-
plain to customers about management issued to harass employer not protected).
See, for example, New River, 945 F2d at 1295 (satirical letter unprotected).
65 See, for example, Caterpillar Tractor Co., 276 NLRB 1323, 1326 (1985) (vulgarity of
cartoon sufficiently offensive to preclude protection).
88 See, for example, American Arbitration, 233 NLRB at 75 ("childish" and unnecessa-
rily ridiculing disparagement unprotected).
7 Kroger Co., 284 NLRB 663, 664 (1987) (employees' insulting comments to customers
about management protected because employee rights permit "some leeway for impulsive
behavior").
68 See Golden Day, 644 F2d at 841 (publicly distributed leaflet critical of day care
center's "cleanliness, teacher's duties, and care of children" protected). See also Misericor-
dia, 623 F2d at 811-14 (employee report critical of deficiencies in emergency room, admis-
sions, and patient care held protected).
69 See New River, 945 F2d at 1295 (satirical letter concerning employer's gift of ice
cream cones to employees unprotected, though containing no vulgarity); Red Top, 455 F2d
at 727 (employees' threats unprotected because intended to harass employer and to inter-
fere with customer relations).
70 Compare American Arbitration, 233 NLRB at 74-75 (sarcastic tone of letters to em-
ployer's clients concerning the employer's drpss code disloyal), with Emarco, Inc., 284
NLRB 832, 833-35 (1987) (employees protected where they told third-party contractor that
employer was no good, did not pay its bills, and could not finish job).
11 Justice Frankfurter presciently hinted at this split in characterizations of labor dis-
putes. Jefferson Standard, 346 US at 481 (Frankfurter, dissenting) ("[T]o float such impre-
cise notions as 'discipline' and 'loyalty' in the context of labor controversies ... is to open
the door wide to individual judgment by Board members and judges"). See also Sierra Pub-
lishing Co. v NLRB, 889 F2d 210, 219 n 13 (9th Cir 1989) ("[M]ost concerted activity could
be described in such a way as to place it within either [loyalty or disloyalty]").
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Ill. A NEw MEASURE OF DISLOYALTY: THE MANDATORY AND
PERMISSIVE SUBJECT DISTINCTION
This Comment proposes that the distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining be used as the
divide between protected activity and disloyalty in public dispar-
agement cases. Public disparagement of areas subject to
mandatory bargaining under § 8(d) of the NLRA would be "re-
lated to" the labor dispute and, hence, protected; public disparage-
ment of areas subject to permissive bargaining would not be "re-
lated to" the labor dispute and, therefore, unprotected. Not only
would this imported standard make sense of Jefferson Standard
and its progeny in the lower courts, it would also provide greater
predictability of results and would lend coherence to two disparate
areas of labor law. Moreover, this standard suggests a bilateral ob-
ligation of the kind favored by NLRA policy: under the new stan-
dard, employers would owe a meaningful duty of loyalty to their
employees.
A. Mandatory/Permissive Standard
Under a standard based on the distinction between mandatory
and permissive bargaining subjects, the issue remains whether the
disparagement is "related to" the labor dispute. However, since the
"related to" standard in its current form is malleable, yielding in-
consistent results, the Board and the courts should find that dis-
paragement is "related to" the labor dispute only if it pertains to a
subject of mandatory bargaining.
Subjects of mandatory-as opposed to permissive-bargaining
involve "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.172 During negotiations, either the employer or union may
press its position on a mandatory subject to impasse and may ap-
ply strong economic pressure, such as strikes or lock-outs to
achieve bargaining concessions. In contrast to the issue of pro-
tected public disparagement, there is exhaustive case law on what
is a mandatory subject of bargaining."
72 29 USC § 158(d) (1988). In early cases construing the NLRA, the NLRB held that
subjects mentioned in § 8(d) are mandatory subjects of bargaining. See, for example, Inland
Steel Co., 77 NLRB 1, 13 (1948) (pension and retirement plans fall within the statutory
duty to bargain collectively).
73 See Patrick Hardin, ed, 1 The Developing Labor Law: The Board, the Courts, and
the National Labor Relations Act 863-928 (BNA Books, 3d ed, 1992) (mandatory bargain-
ing subjects are not limited to the statutory examples; mandatory subjects include provi-
sions for grievance procedures, layoffs, workloads, vacations, sick leave, employee physical
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With permissive subjects, either party may take a position,
but neither may insist on its position to impasse. An opponent
need not bargain over a permissive subject. Permissive subjects in-
clude factors affecting, for example, the relationships between the
employer and third parties.7 '
The NLRA's commitment to managerial prerogative, as un-
derstood by the Court and the NLRB, drives the distinction be-
tween permissive and mandatory subjects of bargaining. The Court
has held that a core of entrepreneurial control exists outside the
realm of collective bargaining.75
B. Managerial Prerogative
The mandatory/permissive standard is the best proxy for
achieving the results the Court in Jefferson Standard intended.
Jefferson Standard involved an assault on an area of the business
over which the technicians had no rightful control. This assault
made "no reference to wages, hours or working conditions."7 6 The
Court found, therefore, that the union had gone beyond the
bounds of its protected interest. Significantly, the Court's lan-
guage, quoted above, nearly replicates the § 8(d) listing of
mandatory bargaining subjects. The Court found that some areas
were to be under management's exclusive control.
The Court's regard for managerial prerogative supports a re-
categorization of the disloyalty doctrine within the established cat-
egories of unprotected, concerted activity. As noted in Section II,
unprotected, concerted activity has traditionally been divided into
examinations, duration of collective bargaining agreement, bonuses, pensions, insurance
plans, company discounts, seniority, and promotions).
74 See First National Maintenance Corp. v NLRB, 452 US 666, 686 (1981) (termination
of contract with customer to provide maintenance workers a permissive subject). See also
Otis Elevator Co., 269 NLRB 891, 892-93 (1984), reversing 255 NLRB 235 (1981) (manage-
ment decision to transfer and consolidate research and development operations rested on a
"fundamental change in the nature and direction of the business" and thus was a permissive
subject); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v NLRB, 379 US 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart con-
curring) (permissive subjects include choice of advertising and promotion, product type and
design, and financing arrangements).
7' First National Maintenance, 452 US at 676-77; Otis Elevator, 269 NLRB at 893;
Fibreboard, 379 US at 223 (Stewart concurring). Justice Stewart coined the phrase "core of
entrepreneurial control," and the First National Maintenance decision is based on his con-
currence. The legislative history of the NLRA firmly supports the Court's interpretation.
See, for example, 79 Cong Rec 7673 (1935), reprinted in 2 Legislative History of the NLRA
at 2394 (cited in note 25) (statement of Senator Walsh) (Listing the fundamental rights of
an employer, Walsh included the right to close a factory and to set the number of the
workforce.).
76 346 US at 476.
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two categories: activity toward an end that is statutorily unlawful
or in violation of an NLRA policy, and activity involving major
misconduct or violence. Most commentators place the disloyalty
doctrine within the latter category, which includes partial work
stoppages and slowdowns. 7 The mandatory/permissive standard
developed in this Comment suggests that the disloyalty doctrine
properly falls within the former category because disparagement
regarding permissive subjects violates a policy of the NLRA-the
safeguarding of managerial prerogative. 8
Characterizing public disparagement as a violation of NLRA
policy when the disparagement aims at permissive subjects of bar-
gaining harmonizes with the policies underlying the NLRA. The
legislative history of the NLRA suggests that Congress did not
want to protect activity aiming at ends contrary to NLRA policy,
or employing means contrary to law or shop rules.71 Congress was
silent, however, on whether public disparagement aims at forbid-
den objectives or employs forbidden means. Public disparagement
might implicate concerns regarding ends or means. In light of the
NLRA's concern for managerial prerogative, the Court in Jefferson
Standard necessarily chose to characterize public disparagement
as pursuit of an impermissible objective.
C. The "Related To" Test: A Fresh Look
The mandatory/permissive standard would resolve much of
the confusion among the circuits and the NLRB surrounding the
"related to" test. By giving substance to the "related to" language,
it would diminish the inconsistency and unpredictability of the
"related to" test.8 0 Moreover, this standard would allow most cir-
cuits to retain their formal framework for analyzing disloyalty
cases.
17 See, for example, Julius G. Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Sec-
tion 7 of the National Labor Relations Act 115 U Pa L Rev 1195, 1231-33 (1967).
7' While this recategorization may at first seem academic, it is significant as the basis
for a bilateral obligation of loyalty between employer and employees. See text accompany-
ing notes 101-15.
79 See text accompanying notes 36-39.
80 The body of law and commentary on the distinction between mandatory and permis-
sive subjects is highly developed in comparison to disloyalty. See Note, Decision-Bargaining
and the NLRA-A Plea for the Resurrection of First National Maintenance Corporation, 68
Tex L Rev 625, 626 (1990) (Supreme Court distinction on subjects of bargaining clear with
high predictability). But see Michael C. Harper, Leveling the Road From Borg-Warner to
First National Maintenance: The Scope of Mandatory Bargaining, 68 Va L Rev 1447, 1449
(1982) ("The Supreme Court, far from providing clear and workable restrictions on
mandatory bargaining, has aggravated the definitional problem.").
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This standard focuses solely on the subject of the disparage-
ment, rather than on the ultimate bargaining object; thus it is a
better proxy for the NLRA's stated policy objectives. In practice,
this standard would not protect public disparagement that is only
remotely "related to" a labor dispute such as handbills disparaging
the nature of a business or public criticism of products. s' No longer
could employees criticize areas of managerial prerogative as a lever
to induce otherwise lawfully sought wage concessions."' Instead, la-
bor would be forced to confront issues directly, thereby fostering a
more forthright debate during labor disputes.
Conversely, this standard would protect disparagement that is
"related to" any subject over which an employer must negotiate
under § 8(d). 83 The relation, in effect, is immediate; the context of
the § 7 analysis extends no further than the disparagement itself.
So long as the subject is a mandatory subject of bargaining, the
public disparagement would be lawful.8 4
The mandatory/permissive standard would resolve current cir-
cuit splits on public disparagement issues. Cases involving dispar-
agement of management policies that are unrelated to the treat-
ment of employees would be resolved in favor of employers. The
management policies criticized in Misericordia and Red Top would
have been subjects of permissive bargaining because they fell
within the zone of managerial prerogative.8 5
For example, Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., 186 NLRB 1050, 1054 (1970), aff'd
NLRB v Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. 466 F2d 380, 394 (DC Cir 1972) (employees distrib-
uting leaflets warning of mice and cockroaches in employer's bottles), and Misericordia, 623
F2d at 814 (employee report critical of hospital procedures).
82 It seems odd that under this proposal employees do not receive the NLRA's protec-
tion for exposing, say, public safety hazards but do receive protection for publicly com-
plaining about the size of company lunch halls. For many reasons, though, § 7 protects the
material self-interest of private sector employees, but not the exercise of moral responsibil-
ity. The NLRA stands in marked contrast to the public employee speech doctrine under the
First Amendment, which protects public employees when speaking on matters of public con-
cern. See Connick v Myers, 461 US 138 (1983).
8 For example, Community Hospital of Roanoke Valley v NLRB, 538 F2d 607, 609
(televised criticism of salary and benefits).
" In thus restricting the protection of public disparagement, this standard gives an
incentive for more constructive union representation. Congress, in passing the NLRA, de-
cided that employees have their greatest stake in mandatory subjects of bargaining. The
proposed restriction to protecting disparagement of mandatory subjects should prevent em-
ployees and unions from squandering their bargaining pressure on such permissive subjects
as product design.
88 See Fibreboard, 379 US at 223 (Stewart concurring), and Otis Elevator, 269 NLRB
at 892 (decisions based on nature and direction of significant facet of business, rather than
on labor costs, are permissive subjects).
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This standard places a stronger emphasis on "labor dispute"
in the phrase "related to the labor dispute." The statutory defini-
tion of "labor dispute," a jurisdictional requirement under the
NLRA, largely mirrors the § 8(d) listing of mandatory subjects of
bargaining.8 6 Generally stated, employee disparagement of permis-
sive subjects of bargaining is not related to a "labor dispute,"
though employees and employers remain free to discuss permissive
subjects. Thus, an employee cannot have a "labor dispute" over,
for example, the employer's product advertising campaign.
Jefferson Standard elevated the importance of the term "la-
bor dispute." The Court in Jefferson Standard severed its analysis
of the handbill's disparagement from its analysis of the techni-
cians' drive for better employment terms.8 Use of the mandatory/
permissive standard would mimic that distinction: disparagement
of permissive subjects would fall outside a "labor dispute" and,
hence, not merit protection.8 Thus, even if the ultimate goal of
striking employees were to gain a wage concession-clearly a
mandatory subject of bargaining-their disparagement of a per-
missive subject would not be protected.
D. Elimination of the Purpose Test
Importing the mandatory/permissive standard would elimi-
nate the ambiguity of the purpose test. Instead of calling for a sub-
jective evaluation of the rhetorical tone, the new standard would
protect all public disparagement that concerns § 8(d) subjects of
8 29 USC § 152(9) (1988) ("labor dispute" includes "any controversy concerning terms,
tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association ... of persons in negoti-
ating... [the] terms or conditions of employment... "). See NLRA of 1935, Comparison of
S 2926 (73d Congress) and S 1958 (74th Congress) Senate Committee Print, 74th Cong, 2d
Sess 30 (1935), reprinted in 1 Legislative History of the NLRA at 1348 (cited in note 25)
("The term 'labor dispute' is used throughout S 1958 and the committee draft, and is an
important jurisdictional requirement in many instances. A carefully phrased as well as a
broad definition seems essential.").
87 See 346 US at 477 ("[T]he findings of the Board effectively separate the attack from
the labor controversy and treat it solely as one made by the company's technical experts
upon the quality of the company's product. As such, it was as adequate a cause for the
discharge of its sponsors as if the labor controversy had not been pending."). See also id at
476 ("The fortuity of the coexistence of a labor dispute affords these technicians no sub-
stantial defense.").
8 This distinction highlights, within the framework of the NLRA, the difference be-
tween public disparagement of a permissive subject and the goal, such as a wage concession,
motivating the disparagement. The distinction's significance arises from the policy of safe-
guarding managerial prerogative.
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mandatory bargaining, regardless of purpose or tone.89 Likewise,
all public disparagement, however mild, that concerns matters
within managerial prerogative would be indefensibly disloyal and,
hence, unprotected.90
Eliminating the purpose test is consistent with Jefferson
Standard, which gives only dubious support for such a test. Al-
though the Court in Jefferson Standard described the handbills as
having a "malicious tone," the handbills were not defamatory or
particularly insulting.9 1 They contained no threats, vulgar lan-
guage, or sarcasm. Rather, the malice derived from the nature of
their attack: the technicians questioned an area of management
prerogative.92
Little hazard attends the demise of the purpose test. Although
employees could become very abusive about their "wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment" without fear of
reprisal, abuse as economic pressure is not troubling. On the con-
trary, it serves an end sanctioned by the NLRA. The Court gener-
ally permits the use of economic pressure in labor disputes, 3 and
the level of abusiveness will likely be limited by the employees'
self-interest. Indeed, the Court in Jefferson Standard indicated
that verbal "terrorism" was likely to cost employees more public
support than it would gain as long as the public realized the source
of the criticism. 4
Moreover, the Court has held protected other speech as harsh
as the handbill's rhetoric. In Linn v Plant Guard Workers, Local
0' Naturally, this standard, like other sections of the NLRA, does not prevent the em-
ployer's recourse to other avenues of relief, such as defamation actions.
90 "Unprotected" activity does not automatically receive severe disciplinary action.
First, an employer must follow standard procedure-usually written reprimands spelled out
in a contract-before the employer may terminate the employee engaged in "unprotected"
activity. See NLRB v Transportation Management Corp., 462 US 393, 404 (1983). Second,
the doctrine of condonation prevents an employer from terminating such an employee when
the employer has tolerated similar behavior in the past. Id. Third, an employer generally
may not, by committing unfair labor practices, provoke an employee into indiscreet action
and then use the indiscretion as a basis for discharge. See Golden Day, 644 F2d at 842.
Fourth, public policy exceptions to the employer's right to discharge may bar reprisals. See
Eastlund, 140 U Pa L Rev at 923 n 8 (cited in note 39) (detailing sources of public policy
exceptions as well as whistleblower protection statutes).
11 See text accompanying note 44.
93 346 US at 476 ("It was a continuing attack... upon the very interests which the
attackers were being paid to conserve and develop.").
9 See NLRB v Insurance Agents'International Union, 361 US 477, 495 (1960) ("[T]he
use of economic pressure ... is not a grudging exception to some policy of completely aca-
demic discussion enjoined by the Act; it is part and parcel of the process of collective
bargaining").
346 US at 477.
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114, the Court acknowledged that the NLRA allows open debate
that sometimes includes blunt and reckless language. 5 With the
New York Times Co. v Sullivan libel standard as an outer bound-
ary, the Court approved of the Board's practice of protecting "in-
temperate, abusive, and inaccurate statements."9 6 Aside from
speech restrictions during union election campaigns, only narrow
exceptions to the protection of speech in the labor context exist.9 7
E. Labor Dispute Identification
The mandatory/permissive standard also largely satisfies the
Court's labor dispute identification concern. The Court in Jeffer-
son Standard emphasized that the employees did not identify that
the handbills arose out of a labor dispute.9 Under the mandatory/
permissive standard, handbills complaining of mandatory subjects
such as wages and hours would, as a practical matter, be easily
identified as arising out of a labor dispute.99
The proposed standard, therefore, removes a counterproduc-
tive tactic from labor's bargaining pressure options. This tactic is
particularly powerful because the public may not assume that
striking employees are making the charges about such matters as
product quality. Yet public disparagement of permissive subjects
usually hurts both the employer and the employees long after the
strike is over. Disparagement of a product may reduce demand,
9- 383 US 53, 58 (1966) ("[Labor disputes] are frequently characterized by bitter and
extreme charges, countercharges, unfounded rumors, vituperations, personal accusations,
misrepresentations and distortions").
11 Id at 61-62. New York Times Co. v Sullivan, 376 US 254, 279-80 (1964), sets a stan-
dard for defamation actions brought by public officials that prohibits only the circulation of
defamatory material known to be false or with a reckless disregard for the truth. See also
Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v Austin, 418 US 264, 282-86 (1974) (exempting derogatory
and insulting epithets from state libel law to encourage open labor debate).
97 Examples include tortious speech and criminal speech. See Farmer v United Broth-
erhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 US 290, 301-05 (1977) (intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress); Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB 1044, 1047 (1984) (striking employees
threatened to kill non-striking employees).
98 346 US at 468, 476-77.
" The Board would not need to study handbills for, for example, the size and promi-
nence of labor insignia nor for a complete description of the labor dispute. See, for example,
Southern California Edison Co., 274 NLRB 1121, 1123-25 (1985) (Board studied buttons
worn by employees in detail for significance to public).
Other protected activity under the NLRA, such as primary picketing, is also self-identi-
fying. Pickets that read "Employer X Hires Scabs" need no union signature. Nor does the
NLRA require one, even though it otherwise provides a host of regulations on picketing. See
29 USC §§ 158(b)(7), 158(g) (1988). The danger of misleading the public is minimal in both
cases: criticism of low wages, for example, triggers an assumption of a labor dispute.
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resulting in layoffs. 100 And, if misleading, the disparagement also
hurts consumers without any attendant benefit.
F. A Bilateral Obligation
Under the duty of loyalty in its current form, neither the
Board nor the courts have ever held any employer activity "dis-
loyal" to employees. Indeed, the question of employer disloyalty
has never been raised. Instead, unlawful employer activity, such as
refusal to bargain collectively, is invariably classified as an unfair
labor practice explicitly prohibited by the NLRA.' 0 ' The duty of
loyalty currently binds only employees, yet the NLRA favors bilat-
eral obligations. The impetus behind both the Taft-Hartley and
Wagner Acts was the perceived need for similar bargaining
strength through bilateral obligations. Supporters of the Taft-
Hartley Act sought symmetry in the statutory obligations on em-
ployers and employees. 102 Likewise, supporters of the Wagner Act
believed they were creating symmetry against the backdrop of
common law rights enjoyed by the employer. 03
The mandatory/permissive standard can accommodate a bilat-
eral obligation. Employers would be found disloyal to their em-
ployees if they publicly disparaged a permissive subject of bargain-
ing for employees. Permissive subjects of bargaining for employees
are few in number and relatively well defined. These areas of em-
ployee prerogative include internal union affairs, selection of par-
ties to a collective bargaining agreement, and selection of a bar-
gaining representative.0
10 See, for example, Red Top, 455 F2d at 724 (employee threatened to lose main cus-
tomer of employer). Of course, demand should decline if striking employees publicly com-
plain of low wages, but once the strike is over, the public can usually assume that the strik-
ers are now satisfied and the previous partial boycott should evaporate. In contrast, publicly
complaining that a product is shoddily made will have an effect on demand after the strike
is over. Reduced demand after the strike is over is almost never in employees' interests.
1 29 USC § 158(a)(5) (1988).
102 For instance, under the Taft-Hartley Act, unions cannot refuse to bargain collec-
tively with their employer. 29 USC § 158(b)(3) (1988). Nor can they restrain or coerce em-
ployees exercising their rights under § 7, which the Taft-Hartley Act amended to include
the right to refrain from assisting a labor organization. 29 USC § 158(b)(1)(A) (1988). Nor
can they cause an employer to discriminate against an employee. 29 USC § 158(b)(2). These
three obligations on employees correspond to obligations placed on employers by the Wag-
ner Act. See, for example, 29 USC § 158(a)(3) (employers may not discriminate against
employees on basis of union membership).
103 See text accompanying notes 28-31.
104 Hardin, The Developing Labor Law at 424-30 (cited in note 73) (other examples of




For example, the Court has held the relationship between the
union and individual employees to be a permissive subject vis-a-vis
the employer.105 Accordingly, the Board should label an employer's
public derision of the union's quality of representation disloyal,
and thus an unfair labor practice.
This duty of employer loyalty rests on the policy of safeguard-
ing employee prerogative. The analysis is familiar; it is the con-
verse of safeguarding managerial prerogative. Just as the techni-
cians in Jefferson Standard had no rightful control over
programming, management has no rightful control over some areas
of employment relations. Again, mandatory and permissive sub-
jects of bargaining properly divide these areas: permissive subjects
of bargaining for employees are areas of employee prerogative.
At this point, the recategorization of the disloyalty doctrine
becomes instructive.10 6 The traditional view has been that unpro-
tected disloyalty can be classified as major misconduct or vio-
lence-that is, such disloyalty violates a statute or a common-law
employment duty not overridden by the NLRA.10 7 Within this
traditional view, a bilateral obligation of loyalty on employers
seems absurd. However, viewing unprotected disloyalty as violative
of a policy of the NLRA renders the obligation bilateral. Safe-
guarding employee prerogative is no less important than safe-
guarding managerial prerogative.
An employer's invasion of employee prerogative should consti-
tute a § 8(a)(1) violation. Section 8(a)(1) forbids an employer "to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7.''108 Section 7 creates a zone of em-
ployee prerogative regarding, at a minimum, self-organization and
the selection of employee representatives.10 9 An employer's public
disparagement of union decisions in these areas invades that § 7
zone.
Classifying this kind of conduct as a § 8(a)(1) violation would
be consistent with other § 8(a)(1) violations. For instance, an em-
ployer commits a § 8(a)(1) violation by interfering with the selec-
tion of a bargaining representative.110 A duty of employer loyalty
in this context would render public disparagement of such a selec-
105 See NLRB v Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 US 342 (1958).
"I See Section III.B of this Comment.
107 See text accompanying note 20.
'08 29 USC § 158(a)(1) (1988).
109 29 USC § 157 (1988). For the text of § 7 in full, see note 12.
", 29 USC § 158(a)(1).
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tion a type of unlawful interference because selection of a bargain-
ing representative is a permissive subject of bargaining.111 Like-
wise, an employer commits a § 8(a)(1) violation by interfering with
the right to self-organization. The mandatory/permissive standard
would protect the exercise of this right from public disparagement
since internal union affairs are a permissive subject of bargain-
ing.112 In these ways, a duty of employer loyalty merely extends
some existing § 8(a)(1) violations to public disparagement by
employers.
Public disparagement of an area of employee prerogative
should be an unfair labor practice ("ULP").11s Making such dispar-
agement a ULP allows the employees to file a complaint with the
NLRB or, if necessary, to strike over the disparagement itself.
ULP strikers are accorded greater protection than "economic"
strikers, that is, employees striking over mandatory subjects of
bargaining. ULP strikers may not be permanently replaced," un-
like economic strikers." 5 This remedy would give employees the
flexibility to strike over a violation they consider significant or to
find a milder form of protest for disparagement they find largely
inoffensive.
CONCLUSION
The NLRB and the courts have not settled on a satisfactory
standard for the disloyalty doctrine. The primary tests for disloy-
alty have low predictive value, borne out in their inconsistent ap-
plication. Much of the confusion has stemmed from an incomplete
reading of Jefferson Standard and the lack of authoritative legisla-
tive history on the outer limits of § 7 protection.
Importing the mandatory/permissive standard into § 7 analy-
sis of disloyalty questions should resolve the confusion. This stan-
dard offers more clearly defined borders between protected and
unprotected public disparagement than the courts currently offer,
and consists of more clearly developed law and scholarship. It also
allows courts an escape from inherently murky purpose analyses.
Moreover, this standard in practice guards against the possibility
of public deception in disparagement cases that the Court recog-
1 See notes 72-75.
12 See id.
11 Just as very few bargaining subject cases involve employee prerogative, few dispar-
agement cases would be likely to involve such a ULP.
114 Mastro Plastics Corp. v NLRB, 350 US 270 (1956).
"1 NLRB v Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 US 333, 345-46 (1938).
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nizes as a danger. Finally, this standard makes sense of Jefferson
Standard, because bargaining subject analysis and § 7 analysis
under Jefferson Standard share a deep regard for managerial
prerogative.
The duty of loyalty under sections 7 and 10(c) is not a com-
mon law artifact. Rather, the duty springs from the NLRA policy
of safeguarding managerial prerogative that the Jefferson Stan-
dard Court found in the Taft-Hartley Act. This origin as an NLRA
policy supports a meaningful duty of loyalty on employers, so that
employers may not through disparagement trample on the equally
important policy of safeguarding employee prerogative. Thus, not
only can two bodies of labor law be synthesized and streamlined,
the opportunity for recognizing a fresh symmetrical duty exists.

